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Introduction
Scholars and practitioners alike are increasingly adopting a 
network perspective to explore criminal phenomena. Varese 
(2010) has noted that, since the 1990s, an increasing number 
of definitions of organised crime have started to include the 
term ‘network’ (p. 7). At the same time, formal network anal-
ysis techniques are being used more and more to study inter-
actions among offenders. Social network analysis (SNA), as 
maintained by Bouchard and Amirault (2013), has finally 
‘taken root in the field of criminology’ (p. 199; see also 
Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004: 79). Moreover, Papachristos 
(2011) has pointed out that we may be witnessing the ‘com-
ing of a networked criminology’ (p. 101).
However, some ambiguity around key concepts still 
remains, starting from the very same notion of ‘network’: is 
it a specific form of organisation or just a collection of actors 
and ties? Are these two perspectives on networks invariably 
intertwined or can we apply social network techniques while 
rejecting the notion of networks as a distinct form of organi-
sation? To shore up the foundations of criminal network 
research, it is vital to fully address this ambiguity. In addi-
tion, while the number of articles devoted to the study of 
criminal networks has undoubtedly increased in the recent 
past, a large proportion of them still remains descriptive in 
nature (Carrington, 2011: 248; Papachristos, 2011: 112; 
Papachristos, 2014: 350). The aim of this article is to foster 
explanatory research in the field by offering some remarks 
on selected critical issues related to the study of criminal 
networks.
This work starts by discussing two different perspectives 
on networks while examining the implications for criminolo-
gists (Section ‘Conceptualising social (and criminal) net-
works’). Ultimately, this article favours an instrumental 
approach to networks, interpreted as a collection of actors 
and ties, and regards it as the most fruitful strategy to foster 
explanation in criminal network research. This approach, 
however, is not without its pitfalls: the section, ‘Potential pit-
falls in criminal network research’, will explore the dangers 
of an over-reliance on structural measures. Finally, the sec-
tion, ‘Explanation in criminal network research: The use of 
QAP regression models’, will discuss a viable strategy to 
assess the determinants of criminal networks, and explaining 
why a given network is structured in the way we have 
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2 Methodological Innovations
observed. This strategy is based on the use of a Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (QAP) regression method.
Finally, two caveats: first, this article mainly focuses on 
the study of criminal networks defined as ‘the organisation 
of criminal groups and activities’ (Carrington, 2011: 236), 
thus leaving aside other possible applications of network 
analysis relevant to criminologist, for instance the study of 
how personal networks may influence crime and delinquency 
(for an insightful review of the latter, see Carrington, 2011: 
236–243). Second, the aim of this article is not to present an 
up-to-date review of literature: Morselli (2009, 2014), 
Carrington (2011) and Bichler and Malm (2015) offer a com-
pelling and comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art 
research in the field.
Conceptualising social (and criminal) 
networks
On the face of it, one might be tempted to regard the question 
of what a network is as a trivial one. However, at least for 
researchers interested in explaining the organisation of crim-
inal activities, the answer is far from unambiguous. Broadly 
speaking, there are two distinct ways of conceptualising net-
works. One perspective, which can be defined as ‘substan-
tive’, interprets networks as a specific form of organisation. 
The second perspective, which can be regarded as ‘instru-
mental’, defines networks as based on the presence of two 
constitutive sets of elements: actors (nodes) and relation-
ships (ties). This dualism is a long-standing source of ambi-
guity and misunderstanding among scholars and practitioners 
alike. Morselli (2009: 10), Von Lampe (2009: 96) and Varese 
(2010: 8) have highlighted the tension between the substan-
tive perspective and the instrumental one in the context of 
criminal networks. Given the increasing popularity of net-
works in criminological research, it is vital to discuss this 
dualism at some length. In addition, the adoption of a sub-
stantive rather than an instrumental approach has a direct 
impact on the extent to which we can perform explanatory 
research in the context of criminal networks. I will now 
examine the defining characteristics of both perspectives.
Networks as a form of organisation
The idea of conceptualising networks as a distinct form of 
organisation arose in opposition to the ‘conventional’ view 
that identifies only two possible forms of coordination 
among economic actors: market and hierarchy (Podolny and 
Page, 1998; Powell, 1990). The latter view can be traced 
back to the seminal work of Ronald Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, published in 1937. In this work, Coase (1937: 388) 
puts forward the idea that production, and by extension eco-
nomic exchange, can be coordinated in two alternative ways: 
(1) through the price mechanism that underpins transactions 
in the market or (2) through the decisions of an entrepreneur 
who directs production within a firm (hierarchy). Coase’s 
ideas gained prominence in the Seventies when Oliver 
Williamson put them at the basis of the new transaction cost 
economics to explain coordination and governance of eco-
nomic activities (Williamson, 1973; also 2005). Over the 
years, the original dichotomy has been reinterpreted 
as a continuum to capture hybrid forms of governance, 
for instance long-term contracting (see, for example, 
Williamson, 2005: 7). However, this continuum remains 
firmly anchored in the market vs. hierarchy framework.
Organisational scholars and sociologists have challenged 
the premises of the Coase-Williamson framework by sug-
gesting the presence of a third, separate, mode of exchange: 
the network. According to Powell (1990), the continuum 
suggested by Williamson is still ‘too quiescent and mechani-
cal’ (p. 299); by ‘sticking to the twin pillars of markets and 
hierarchies, our attention is deflected from a diversity of 
organizational designs that are neither fish nor fowl, nor 
some mongrel hybrid, but a distinctly different form’ 
(p. 299). He then suggested a third form of organisation, 
namely the network, defined in the following way:
Networks are ‘lighter on their feet’ than hierarchies. In network 
modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through 
discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through 
networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, 
mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they 
involve neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar 
paternalism of the hierarchy. (Powell, 1990: 303)
Podolny and Page (1998) offer a more formal definition 
of ‘network’ as a distinct form of organisation:
We define a network form of organization as any collection of 
actors (N ⩾2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations 
with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve dispute that may 
arise during the exchange. (p. 59)
One of the defining characteristics of the network form of 
organisation is trust. According to Podolny and Page (1998), 
a ‘more trusting ethic’ makes the network ‘not reducible to a 
hybridization of market and hierarchical forms, which, in 
contrast, are premised on a more adversarial posture’ (p. 61).
Scholars in criminology have also embraced the concept 
of network to describe a (supposedly) new mode of operation 
adopted by criminals as well as terrorists. This ‘emerging’ 
organisational form is believed to pose a ‘new’ threat to the 
security of states (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). For exam-
ple, Williams (2001) maintains that ‘there is a growing rec-
ognition that organized crime is increasingly operating 
through fluid network structures rather than more formal 
hierarchies’ (p. 62). He points out that ‘networks are one of 
the most common forms of social organization. They are 
simultaneously pervasive and intangible, ubiquitous and 
invisible, everywhere and nowhere’ (Williams, 2001: 64). 
According to Williams (2001), networks are ‘an ideal form 
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for organizing criminal activities’ (p. 64) as they possess a 
number of characteristics that makes them particularly 
appealing to criminals: they are flexible and dynamic (p. 67); 
they are able to limit the exposure to risks as networks pos-
sess limited fixed assets and higher adaptation than hierar-
chies (p. 74); and they allow the formation of flexible 
alliances among criminals as well as between criminals and 
corrupt individuals (p. 77–80). Practitioners too have 
embraced the ‘new’ network paradigm and have started to 
adopt the network form of organisation in their description of 
the underworld. For instance, the latest Serious and Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment compiled by Europol (2013), 
explicitly states that ‘it appears that criminal groups increas-
ingly employ network forms of organisation and behaviour’ 
(Europol, 2013: 33). Yet, the popularity of a substantive net-
work perspective in the study of the organisation of criminal 
activities has not always been matched with a thorough 
reflection on the limits of such an approach. While, accord-
ing to a number of scholars, the network form of organisation 
appears to be able to capture the essence of contemporary 
criminal endeavours (see, among others, Castells, 2000: ch. 
3; Williams, 2001), a closer scrutiny of real-world evidence 
reveals a different picture.
Interpreting networks as a form of organisation rules out 
the possibility of looking at hierarchies through the network 
lens. This is indeed very limiting. As pointed out by Varese 
(2010), ‘hierarchies too are networks’ and ultimately ‘any 
organization can be thought of as a network-based social sys-
tem’ (p. 13). Varese (2013) compellingly shows the potential 
of analysing the connections between members of a hierar-
chical organisation through a network approach (in this case 
it was a Russian Mafia group). By reconstructing the infor-
mal patterns of interaction, one can derive the structure of 
hierarchical organisations from the ground (Varese 2010, 
2013; Campana and Varese 2012). This opens up the possi-
bility to develop formal models to assess the determinants of 
these interactions as well as their change over time; crucially, 
this can also be carried out in relation to hierarchies 
(Campana and Varese, 2012; Varese, 2013; see also the sec-
tion, ‘Explanation in criminal network research: The use of 
QAP regression models’).
Furthermore, not only organisations with an established 
hierarchy will be out of our reach, but the very same forms of 
organisation that are neither market nor hierarchy may, 
indeed, fall outside the conceptual domain of a substantive 
approach to networks. For instance, Campana (2015) pre-
sents a study of a transnational Nigerian human trafficking 
ring. The study shows that the ring under scrutiny does not 
possess an established hierarchy that is in control of all the 
activities, while being neither completely flat nor ‘fluid’. In 
other words, this ring is neither a classic example of hierar-
chy nor just a host of market-based transactions. However, 
the formal definition of the network form of organisation 
given by Podolny and Page (1998), or the one given by 
Powell (1990), seems unable to capture the dynamics 
observed in this ring. For instance, the majority of the key 
actors did not pursue repeated and enduring exchange rela-
tions with one another, that is, a defining property of the net-
work form of organisation as interpreted by Podolny and 
Page (1998). Yet, this was not a completely flat ring as some 
degree of centralised coordination was indeed detected. In 
other words, a substantive approach to networks offers very 
limited analytical help; on the contrary, a continuum between 
market and hierarchy seems to capture reality much better.
Finally, the stress on trust as a constitutive element of the 
network mode of organisation (Podolny and Page, 1998: 61) 
is hard to reconcile with the reality of the Nigerian traffick-
ing ring or, indeed, the underworld more generally. As docu-
mented by Campana and Varese (2013), trust is often in 
scarce supply among law-breakers (see also McCarthy et al., 
1998).
Contrary to the received wisdom that sees the network 
form of organisation as ‘pervasive’ and ‘ubiquitous’ 
(Williams, 2001: 64, also Castells, 2000), the reality is that 
such an approach is indeed very limiting and often hard to 
reconcile with real-world manifestations of criminal endeav-
ours. It is precisely because our object of study is situated on 
an extended continuum ranging, as noted by Morselli (2009: 
1), from ‘a one-time partnership to execute a criminal ven-
ture’ to a ‘bureaucratic-like infrastructure that demands and 
enforces exclusivity on the actions and productivity of mem-
bers’ that we need a radically different approach to the study 
of criminal networks. This article argues that the alternative 
approach discussed below is better-suited to fully grasp the 
mechanisms underpinning the organisation of criminal activ-
ities, and places us in a better position to test hypotheses on 
the formation of ties in criminal networks. Ultimately, as 
argued by Varese (2010: 13), ‘whether an organization is 
“slow moving” or “quick on its feet” is an empirical question 
rather than a theoretical premise or assumption’. Structure 
should be empirically reconstructed rather than assumed 
(Morselli, 2009: 18).
The instrumental perspective on networks
Rather than a distinct form of organisation, networks can be 
conceptualised as based on the presence of two distinct sets 
of entities: actors (nodes) and relationships (ties). Wasserman 
and Faust (1994) define a network as:
a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined 
on them. (p. 20)
Similarly, Robins (2015) defines a social network as ‘a set 
of social actors and a relationship among them in the form of 
dyadic relational ties’ (p. 18, emphasis in the original). Within 
the broad domain of networks, ‘social networks are impor-
tantly distinctive in one major regard: the actors in the network 
have intentionality’ (Robins, 2015: 5, emphasis in the original). 
By and large, this is an instrumental perspective on networks. 
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As pointed out by Borgatti et al. (2013), networks are ‘a way of 
thinking about social systems that focuses our attention on the 
relationships among the entities that make up the system, which 
we call actors and nodes’ (p. 1). This perspective is commonly 
referred to as Social Network Analysis (SNA).
SNA offers a set of conceptual tools and analytic proce-
dures that allows researchers to first collect and systematise 
evidence in a relational way and then use the same evidence 
to test substantive hypotheses. When interpreted in this way, 
the concept of networks thus ‘provides us with a way of 
viewing social relations. It is not a theory of society, though 
the builders of theories will have to take such networks into 
account’ (Boissevain, 1974: 24–25). By adopting a relational 
approach to data collection, we are in a position to gather 
evidence on both actors and ties in a network, including the 
attributes of both entities (actors and ties). In very simple 
terms, the most basic unit of analysis is the dyad ‘Actor-Tie-
Actor’ (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 18). Once relational 
evidence has been collected, one can then run joint analyses 
of actors and ties (for a comprehensive discussion of SNA, 
see Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Carrington et al., 2005; 
Borgatti et al. 2013; Robins 2015).
An instrumental approach to networks has been applied to 
the study of a number of different social phenomena, from 
occupational mobility to research on communities, groups, 
markets and organisations (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 6). 
Yet, the broad reach of this approach has come under criti-
cism. For instance, the definition of ‘network’ upon which it 
is premised has been regarded as a ‘loose definition, desig-
nating nothing more than a set of interlinked elements that 
form a coordinating structure’ (Thompson, 2003: 54). Its 
ability to encompass a vast variety of organisational forms, 
including both markets and hierarchies, has been interpreted 
as a major limitation (Podolny and Page, 1998; Powell, 1990; 
Thompson, 2003). A second, related, criticism that has been 
formulated is that SNA is an empirically driven approach 
that lacks a structural model for the explanation of the phe-
nomena observed (Thompson, 2003: 56). This article takes a 
different view, and contends that what may be perceived as a 
weakness is in reality a strength. For example, by not assum-
ing a structure a priori, it is possible to test hypotheses on the 
mechanisms that have brought about that very same struc-
ture. Network analysis can indeed be combined with one or 
more substantive theories of network processes, such as pref-
erential attachment, structural balance, social selection and 
social influence (for a review, see Robins, 2015: 28–38). 
More generally, SNA achieves its full potential when it is 
matched with substantive, theory-driven, research questions 
(Varese, 2010: 13; Campana 2015). There is no need to con-
flate the network approach with any prior assumption about 
the structure of a network, as the ‘network model’ of organi-
sation would require. For instance, as suggested by Von 
Lampe (2009: 96), problems that have been formulated 
within organisational theory can find an answer using a net-
work analysis approach.
In criminology, a network analysis approach to the study of 
organised criminal activities has been fruitfully adopted by an 
increasing number of scholars. Among the most recent works, 
Varese (2012, 2013) has applied SNA to the study of a Russian 
Mafia group; Campana and Varese (2013) to the comparative 
study of cooperation within a Russian and an Italian mafia 
group; Mancuso (2014), Morselli and Savoie-Gargiso (2014); 
Malm and Bichler (2011) and Campana (2015) to investigate 
human trafficking; Calderoni (2012) and Bright et al. (2012) to 
explore drug trafficking. Calderoni and Piccardi (2014) have 
applied a specific community detection algorithm (indeed, a 
network analysis technique) to reconstruct the structure of a 
Mafia organisation based on the attendance of its associates to 
meetings that were monitored by the police. Morselli (2014) 
offers an insightful collection of studies that have adopted a 
network approach to investigate a number of criminal phe-
nomena, including the evolution of a drug co-arrest network 
(Iwanski and Frank, 2014), homophily effects among co-
offenders (Van Mastrigt and Carrington, 2014), the core mem-
bership of a youth gang (Bouchard and Konarski, 2014), drug 
trafficking (Boivin, 2014; Gimenez-Salinas Framis, 2014) and 
cybercrime (Decary-Hetu, 2014; Dupont, 2014) as well as his-
torical networks such as that established by Al Capone in 
Chicago during the Prohibition era (Papachristos and Smith, 
2014). Earlier pioneering works using formal network models 
include Natarajan (2000, 2006), Morselli (2005) and Varese 
(2006).
Ultimately, the instrumental approach to networks (SNA) 
does not assume the existence of any structure a priori, but 
derives it from the evidence collected in a relational way 
(Morselli, 2009: 18–21; Varese 2010: 13; Campana and 
Varese 2012). This makes such an approach rather appealing, 
and well-suited to test hypotheses on the mechanisms that 
may have brought about the structure observed. However, 
this approach is not without its drawbacks, and I will now 
turn to discuss some possible perils.
Potential pitfalls in criminal network 
research
This section briefly touches upon a selection of issues that 
may arise when adopting an instrumental approach (SNA) to 
the study of criminal networks.
Dangers related to data collection
Inevitably, an instrumental approach to social networks is 
highly sensitive to the quality of the data collected. As with 
any network data, criminal network data is subject to a num-
ber of threats to validity and reliability. These include the 
incorrect attribution of characteristics of nodes and ties, and 
errors in data mining and in secondary sources (Borgatti 
et al., 2013: 37–40). Sampling can also be problematic: con-
trary to non-network approaches, a random sampling may 
severely distort inferences when a network is clustered 
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around very few focal nodes (Robins, 2015: 11). Boundary-
specification problems and issues of missing data can also be 
particularly acute (Kossinets, 2006; Robins, 2015: ch. 5). 
These threats are inherent to all network data; however, the 
specific nature of criminal behaviour may exacerbate the 
impact of some of them. For instance, missing data, i.e., 
potential missing nodes or ties, can pose a very serious issue 
to the validity of criminal network data; external validity 
procedures should therefore be adopted to double-check the 
evidence extracted from a given source (Campana and 
Varese, 2012: 16–17). When dealing with court records and 
police investigations, Campana and Varese (2012) suggest 
performing external validity checks based on information 
extracted from additional court and law enforcement files, 
interviews with key informants and other open source 
records. Whenever possible, an internal validity control (i.e. 
internal to the same source) should also be carried out, for 
example by contrasting the information extracted from the 
content of the tapped phone calls with the metadata related to 
the same set of conversations. Ultimately, the coverage of a 
specific source of network data should be carefully and criti-
cally scrutinised by researchers using all available contextual 
evidence.
An additional problem relates to the identification of the 
boundaries of a given network (Kossinets, 2006; Laumann 
et al., 1989). This is a key issue in network analysis, and it is 
arguably exacerbated in the case of criminal networks. This 
is due, for instance, to the lack of an accessible membership 
list according to which nodes can be included in a network. 
In addition, the boundary-specification problem may become 
even more acute when networks are composed of largely 
independent actors carrying out market-based transactions 
(Bouchard and Morselli, 2014: 294–295). Both the coverage 
and the boundary-specification problem have a direct impact 
on network measures, as the latter tends to be largely depend-
ent on the structure of the network as a whole (Robins, 2015: 
117). Morselli (2009: 44–50) and Berlusconi (2013) explore 
the impact of missing data and boundary-specification on 
real-world criminal networks.
Campana and Varese (2012) and Bright et al. (2012) 
critically assess the different sources of data that are avail-
able within the justice system, and the potential biases that 
each may include. The work of Campana (2015) shows 
that, when only an incomplete or not sufficiently reliable 
set of ‘1-mode’ network ties is available, researchers could 
adopt a ‘2-mode’ data collection strategy to minimise biases 
arising from coverage and boundary-specification prob-
lems. A typical ‘2-mode’ coding strategy would generate a 
network based on a series of events and the actors (nodes) 
associated with them. In summary, structural measures can 
be subject to biases due to errors, sampling procedures, 
boundary-specification problems and missing data. 
However, even structural measures that are not biased can 
still pose a challenge for researchers, particularly in rela-
tion to their interpretation.
Additional dangers in the interpretation of 
network data
Structural measures are indeed a very useful tool to investi-
gate criminal network data. However, an over-reliance on 
structural measures alone without an adequate grasp of the 
context may lead to ambiguous or, worse still, misleading 
conclusions. If taken out of context, even simple statistics 
such as degree centrality, that is, the number of ties that an 
actor exchanges with the other actors in the network, may be 
rather ambiguous. Ambiguity can manifest itself in a number 
of ways that are worth discussing at some length.
Centrality measures are arguably among the most com-
mon statistical measures that researchers and practitioners 
alike calculate on criminal network data (for a formal discus-
sion of centrality measures, see Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 
ch. 5). While the idea behind most of these measures – par-
ticularly degree centrality – is relatively straightforward, 
their interpretation is not always without challenges. Let us 
take degree centrality as an example. A high level of degree 
centrality is usually taken as an indication of prominence of 
a given actor. Conversely, a low level of degree centrality is 
commonly associated with peripheral actors. The latter are 
often interpreted as performing less important roles in a net-
work. This may indeed hold true for many networks; how-
ever, this is not necessarily the case for all networks. To 
illustrate this point, I now turn to some additional analysis of 
the network included in Campana (2015).
The network under scrutiny includes 58 actors, of which 
25 are offenders and 33 are victims. Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of degree centrality for the 25 offenders.1 In this 
network, degree centrality indicates the level of participation 
in trafficking activities by each individual. Two actors imme-
diately stand out as the most central players (#1 and #2); a 
third offender (#4) also scores relatively high. Then, the 
index quickly drops and we observe a rather large number of 
peripheral actors (a core group of three offenders was also 
identified by a core-periphery algorithm). Based on this fig-
ure, one would be tempted to conclude that the key players 
are only Actor #1, #2 and #4. The reality, however, is more 
complex.
Figure 1. Human trafficking network: degree centrality by actor.
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Based on the content of the phone conversations wire-
tapped and other evidence included in the court files, four 
distinct roles where identified: management, resource acqui-
sition, escorting of victims (‘trolley’) and the so-called ‘mad-
ams’, typically former prostitutes turned into traffickers (for 
a full description, see Campana, 2015). On average, ‘mad-
ams’ present the lowest degree centrality in the network.2 
Should we therefore conclude that they also have a marginal 
role in the trafficking ring?
If we base our judgement on structural measures only, 
the answer will be in the affirmative. However, the content 
of the phone conversations and other evidence extracted 
from the court files tell us that this is not the case. In fact, it 
was the ‘madams’ who were generating the demand for the 
trafficking services that were then supplied by the individu-
als coded as ‘management’ (Actor #1 and #2 are included in 
this category). Indeed, the ‘managers’ were in charge of the 
transportation of victims from Nigeria to Europe, and in 
this respect they played an important role. Nonetheless, 
they worked as contractors hired by the ‘madams’. The low 
degree centrality of ‘madams’ is explained by the fact that 
they were largely independent of each other and of the 
other offenders (each tie in this network records the co-
participation of two offenders in a given trafficking event). 
Yet, by no means are they marginal players in the ring; 
quite the opposite is true: they can be considered as key 
players (see Campana, 2015 for additional details on the 
modus operandi of the network).
What is crucial to stress here is that the presence of a tie is 
not the only important feature of a criminal network; the 
absence of a tie can be equally telling. Understanding the 
reasons why an actor has not established a given tie with 
another actor can be very informative (provided, of course, 
that this was not due to missing data). For this reason, one 
needs to complement structural measures with additional 
(often qualitative) evidence to have a full grasp of the mech-
anisms at play.
More generally, a joint analysis of the structure and con-
tent of criminal connections has been advocated by Campana 
and Varese (2012) and Varese (2013). Building on Natarajan 
(2000, 2006), Varese (2013) employs both structural meas-
ures and a systematic coding of the orders given by each 
actor to empirically test to what extent the Russian Mafia 
group under scrutiny could be considered ‘flat’ or hierarchi-
cally structured. Similarly, Calderoni (2012) includes both 
structural measures and measures of ‘status’ in his analysis 
of two Mafia organisations involved in drug trafficking. 
Westlake et al. (2011: 11) have applied a formal model devel-
oped by Schwartz and Rouselle (2009) to identify key play-
ers in an online child exploitation network; their model 
combines a measure of the resources available to each actor 
with measures of cohesion of the network as well as the 
strength of the relationships between actors. Instead of a 
task-based approach, Carley et al. (2002) have suggested tak-
ing the cognitive abilities of each actor into consideration in 
order to identify potential ‘leaders’. In their view, leaders 
may or may not be the central nodes in a network.3
In addition, based on the idea that ‘centrality comes in 
many different forms’ (Morselli, 2010: 384), one can analyse 
the joint distribution of different centrality measures. For 
instance, Morselli (2010) has looked at a joint distribution of 
degree and betweenness centrality in order to identify differ-
ent types of individual positioning within criminal networks. 
His work has shown that the individual positioning had an 
impact on the likelihood of arrest in the case of a Hells 
Angels group based in Canada: actors with high betweenness 
centrality but low degree centrality were less likely to be 
arrested (Morselli, 2010: 389).
To summarise, both the presence and the absence of a tie 
can equally represent an important feature of a given net-
work. Up to this point, the article has focussed on the analy-
sis of a single network. In reality, people, and indeed 
offenders, may share a multiplicity of ties (see, for example, 
Boissevain, 1974: 28–32). These ties can be both economic, 
for instance financial transactions, and non-economic, such 
as kinship.4 To gain a full grasp of the mechanisms at play, 
one can model multiple networks simultaneously in a fash-
ion similar to regression models. I will now discuss a possi-
ble strategy of doing so that is particularly well-suited to the 
analysis of criminal network data.
Explanation in criminal network 
research: the use of QAP regression 
models
Carrington (2011) has aptly noted that research on criminal 
networks ‘tends to be exploratory and descriptive rather than 
theory-testing’ (p. 244); for the most part, ‘it seeks to give a 
(literally) graphic account of the structure of the network 
being studied’ (p. 248). This has been reiterated by 
Papachristos (2014: 350; Papachristos, 2011: 112). Recently, 
there have been some interesting developments in teasing 
out possible factors that may lead to the disruption of crimi-
nal networks. Bichler and Malm (2015) include an informed, 
up-to-date, collection of works spelling out strategies to pre-
venting crime by applying SNA to the study of various forms 
of organised crime and terrorism (on the structural differ-
ences between organised crime and terrorism due to their 
distinct time-to-task requirement, see Morselli et al., 2007). 
Yet, by and large, Carrington’s observation still holds true.
There are a host of reasons that may account for the lim-
ited number of explanatory studies using criminal networks, 
including the difficulties in accessing good quality data (on 
this, see; Campana and Varese, 2012; Bright et al., 2012). A 
further – yet crucial – complication lies with the very same 
nature of the data collected within a network framework. 
Due to their relational nature, network data violate the 
assumption of independence of observations upon which 
standard statistical models are built (Robins, 2015: 11; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 4–5). This is a potentially 
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serious problem as significance tests commonly included in 
standard statistical packages do assume independence of 
observations (Borgatti et al., 2013: 126). The implication is 
that, when seeking to explain how a given structure has been 
brought about (i.e. tie-formation), one cannot rely on the 
usual statistical tools. Yet, there are solutions to this problem 
as I briefly discuss below.
QAP regression models
The use of QAP regression models to test hypotheses on the 
organisation of criminal activities has been largely over-
looked by criminologists. Nevertheless, these models may 
prove to be a very fruitful tool. QAP procedures offer a solu-
tion to the problem of auto-correlation, or non-independence, 
of observations (Dekker et al. 2007; Krackhardt, 1987, 
1988). More specifically, QAP models are based on a family 
of procedures to perform a permutation-based nonparametric 
test of statistical significance on network data (Dekker et al., 
2007: 565–566). The approach is akin to a linear regression, 
and the results can be interpreted in a similar way. In the case 
of a QAP regression, we typically regress a dependent net-
work matrix on two or more independent network matrices. 
Regression coefficients are estimated through an ordinary 
least squares method (OLS). The major departure from a 
standard regression model is constituted by the way the sig-
nificance test for these coefficients is performed. In a nut-
shell, a QAP procedure would create a number of randomly 
permuted matrices – usually between 10,000 and 50,000 – 
that are a random rearrangement of the original one. To 
determine whether a regression coefficient is statistically 
significant, the procedure compares the observed coefficient 
against the distribution of the same coefficient calculated on 
the randomly permuted matrices. If the observed coefficient 
is greater than 95 per cent of the random coefficients, this is 
considered to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see 
Borgatti et al., 2013:126–133; Whitbred, 2011: 732–734). 
Earlier approaches to permutation tests were confined to a 
rather restricted set of conditions (Dekker et al., 2007: 565). 
However, progress has been made on how permutations are 
performed and recently, thanks to the work of Dekker et al. 
(2007), a new permutation method has been proposed: 
Double-Semi-Partialing (DSP). Dekker et al. (2007) have 
shown the DSP method to be reasonably robust in models in 
which the dependent variable is continuous or at least count-
able integers (Poisson-like; for a formal description of the 
method, see Dekker et al., 2007).5 The appeal of QAP regres-
sion models to criminologists lies in their ability to handle 
valued networks as dependent variables. The implication is 
that one can model the strength of contacts among offenders, 
for example, based on the number of phone calls exchanged 
or meetings attended.6 Some basic conditions, however, need 
to be met in order for a QAP regression to be performed: all 
the matrices need to be square and of the same size, and they 
all have to include exactly the same actors.7
Campana and Varese (2013) and Campana (2015) have 
pioneered the use of QAP models to test hypotheses using 
real-world criminal network data. Campana and Varese 
(2013) have tested the impact of kinship and violence on fos-
tering cooperation among criminals. They have interpreted 
both devices as a way to establish credible commitments 
among offenders, thus situating their work in the broad lit-
erature on cooperation in the absence of law and trust. They 
collected data on contacts exchanged by members of two 
mafia organisations – a Russian Mafia group and a Neapolitan 
Camorra clan – and ran a series of QAP multiple regression 
models to estimate the impact on tie-formation of sharing 
information about violent acts and of sharing a kin-tie when 
controlling for other variables such as sharing the same task 
within the organisation. They have found evidence that both 
factors, kinship and violence, enhance cooperation. In addi-
tion, they have also discovered that violence has a much 
greater impact than kinship even in groups made up of rela-
tives. They have concluded that there is nothing ontological 
in the role of kinship in organised crime, and when better and 
more reliable mechanisms to increase commitment are avail-
able, criminals will resort to them, just as organisations in 
advanced societies tend to rely on merit rather than kinship.
Campana (2015) is a study of the organisation of human 
trafficking. It relies on a novel, manually built, dataset 
recording the co-participation of offenders in trafficking 
activities between Nigeria and Europe (victims are also 
included in the dataset). It first elaborates a theoretical frame-
work to interpret trafficking activities based on Coase (1937) 
and the theory of agency, and then derives and tests a number 
of substantive hypotheses on the organisation of ‘high-
capacity’ trafficking networks. The network under scrutiny 
shows a tendency towards a separation between different 
stages of the trafficking process as a strategy to decrease 
monitoring costs and thus increase the overall ‘trafficking 
capacity’ of the ring. In addition, the study shows that even 
in networks that are not a unified organisation, there is still 
some level of centralisation. Nonetheless, coordination sup-
plied by the core group of offenders did not extend to all the 
stages of the trafficking process, but was mostly confined to 
the transportation stage. Finally, a QAP regression model has 
also shown that, contrary to a widely held belief, the traffick-
ing ring was not run along ethnic or family lines. Rather, a 
more sophisticated model based on division of labour and 
role specialisation was adopted by traffickers.
The QAP procedure presents some limitations. By per-
forming random permutations on a matrix, it is able to cal-
culate a significance test that is not biased by the 
non-independence of observations; however, the types of 
dependence present in a given network are not directly mod-
elled. In other words, it is not possible to estimate the impact 
of local network configurations on the global structure of a 
network. Network processes such as reciprocity, local clo-
sure or more complex forms of dependence cannot be mod-
elled directly, and therefore a measure of their impact cannot 
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be estimated (for a formal discussion of different dependence 
assumptions, see Koskinen and Daraganova, 2013). To 
model structural configurations and actor-level attributes 
simultaneously, one needs to adopt a different strategy, for 
example, fitting an Exponential Random Graph Model 
(ERGM; for an excellent discussion on ERGMs, see Lusher 
et al., 2013). To date, ERGMs have been mostly limited to 
binary networks, and therefore used to predict the presence 
or absence of a tie, and not the strength of a relationship 
(Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 2015: 193–194). Attempts to 
extend these models to valued networks are currently under 
way (see, for example, Krivitsky, 2012). In criminology, 
ERGMs have recently been applied to test hypotheses using 
binary networks in relation to intra-gang violence 
(Papachristos et al., 2013) and the role of ethnic homophily 
in gangs (Grund and Densley, 2015).8
Conclusion
This article has offered some remarks on a few critical issues 
related to explanation in criminal network research. It has 
first discussed two perspectives on networks, namely a sub-
stantive approach that views networks as a distinct form of 
organisation, and an instrumental approach that interprets 
networks as a collection of nodes and attributes. The latter is 
at the basis of SNA. Ultimately, this article has argued 
against the conflation between the substantive and the 
instrumental approach. It has contended that the instrumen-
tal perspective (SNA) is the most productive strategy to fos-
ter explanation in criminal network research – in line with, 
among others, Varese (2006, 2013), Morselli (2009) and 
Campana and Varese (2012). SNA techniques can be fruit-
fully applied to explain criminal networks while rejecting 
the notion of networks as a distinct form of organisation. In 
addition, the instrumental approach allows researchers to 
derive the structure of a network from the empirical evi-
dence rather than merely assuming it (Morselli, 2009; 
Varese, 2010). This also opens up the possibility to test 
hypotheses on tie-formation using real-world data. SNA 
achieves its full potential when matched with substantive, 
theory-driven, research questions.
This approach, however, is not without its pitfalls. Besides 
the issues related to data collection and the quality of the data 
available, this article has cautioned against an over-reliance 
on structural measures alone as the latter may lead to ambig-
uous if not misleading interpretations. In line with Varese 
(2013) and Campana and Varese (2012), this article has thus 
invoked a greater emphasis on additional – qualitative – evi-
dence when investigating real-world criminal networks. 
Finally, this work has sought to foster explanation in crimi-
nal network research by discussing an empirical strategy to 
test hypotheses using (multiple) network datasets. This strat-
egy is based on QAP regression models. Some recent appli-
cations reviewed in the article have shown this procedure to 
be particularly apt for the study of a number of research 
questions relevant to criminal network researchers.
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Notes
1. An analysis of the betweenness centrality distribution leads to 
the same results; the correlation between degree and between-
ness centrality is very close to 1 (correlation coefficient: 0.996).
2. Madams have an average degree centrality of 2.51; by con-
trast, individuals with managerial roles have an average degree 
centrality of 16.47 (normalised coefficients).
3. In her review of covert networks, Oliver (2014) notes that 
there is no agreement as to when a given network structure 
should be classified as ‘centralised’ or ‘decentralised’ based 
on a degree centralisation score only (p. 10). Again, a possible 
solution consists in jointly analysing the structure and the con-
tent of criminal connections (see also Campana 2011: 223).
4. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting including 
this point.
5. Dekker et al. (2007: 580) suggest using a t-statistic as a pivotal 
statistic. Permutation methods for models with binary depend-
ent matrices are currently being developed (Borgatti et al., 
2013: 129–133), but their robustness has not yet been fully 
assessed (Dekker et al., 2007: 580).
6. It is possible to perform a QAP regression using two of the 
most common software packages currently available: Ucinet 
(MRQAP Linear Regression via Double-Dekker Semi-
Partialling) and R (package ‘sna’).
7. In addition, matrices need to be one mode (Whitbred, 2011: 
732).
8. This article focuses on the issue of explanation using cross-
sectional data only. However, time can also be modelled and 
dynamic approaches to network analysis have been fruitfully 
developed, including stochastic actor-based models for net-
work dynamics (see Snijders, 2011).
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